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Conflicts of Interest & Other Ethical Issues*
Mr. Marc Kieselstein, Honorable Judith Fitzgerald &
Professor Douglas Baird
MR. KIESELSTEIN: It's good to see everyone here this morning.
We're going to be talking about ethical issues in the bankruptcy prac-
tice, and we've been asked to shorten up our presentation some,
which is imminently predictable. It always happens with the legal eth-
ics discussion at these conferences. As you probably already know,
it's also the least attended class in law school, as I recall. But it is very
important, and we want to touch on some of the significant issues.
The first thing to keep in mind is that there is no stand-alone set of
ethical rules for bankruptcy lawyers. The Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility and the Canons of Ethics apply as they would in any other
area of practice. I would say that in the practice of bankruptcy, and in
particular in the mega cases, those rules are sometimes stressed almost
to the breaking point. This is because unlike a stand-alone piece of
litigation or a transaction when you're sort of looking your adversary
in the eye, in the bankruptcy context you have hundreds, thousands,
tens of thousands of parties at interest, which is a defined term under
the Bankruptcy Code and basically gives anyone the right to step up
and be heard on a case if they have some pecuniary interest in its
outcome. So you've got to keep in mind all of these variant interests
when you take on a representation.
We are briefly going to touch on these stresses in three separate
areas. First, is debtor's counsel. When you act as a debtor's counsel,
you have to be what is called "disinterested." That is to say, you can't
hold a claim adverse to the estate. They can't hold claims against you
and various other touchstones for that test. But you have to be able to
make sure that you are in a position where the court believes you're
pursuing the debtor's agenda and no other, and you have no conflict-
ing agendas or loyalties that would prevent you from doing that. And
we'll talk about how that one in particular situation gets stress tested.
* This is an edited version of the transcript from the third panel at the DEPAUL BUSINESS
AND COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL SYMPOSIUM, Mega-Bankruptcies: Representing Creditors and
Debtors in Large Bankruptcies, held on April 10, 2003.
558 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
Second, on the creditors' side is multiple representations of credi-
tors in a single bankruptcy case. It is very, very common that you will
have one lawyer in a mega case that represents 10, 15, 20, 30 different
creditors, sometimes similarly situated, sometimes with different agen-
das. How can that work? How can that possibly be? Is that also a
stress point? We'll talk about how to maneuver through that process.
Returning to the role of the debtor's counsel, there's sort of a meta-
physical question; that is, when you are debtor's counsel and if it's a
debtor you're dealing with, you're by definition in that zone of insol-
vency or beyond, who are you really representing? Are you repre-
senting the debtor? Are you representing the metaphysical estate?
Do you owe duties to particular creditors who will tell you, as they
always tell me, you're working for me. We, the creditors, own the
company. If that's the case, how do I discharge my duties and to
whom do I discharge them?
Let me start with the sort of first issue, that is, debtor's counsel, how
do you become debtor's counsel? What are some of the pitfalls? To
be debtor's counsel, you have to be retained by motion after notice in
hearing in the bankruptcy court under Section 327(a) of the Code.
And as I said, § 327(a) requires that you be disinterested, and that
means you're not a creditor, you're not an equity holder, you're not
an insider; that is, you're not an officer or director or one of your
partners wasn't the secretary of the corporation, something like that
could trip you up, and that you don't hold an interest that's materially
adverse to the interest of the estate.
It seems simple enough, but in a mega case, it's not simple at all.
What you have to do, sometimes months before you file your case, is
run an incredibly comprehensive conflict check. You have to get lists
from your client of every stakeholder in the case that might have any
significant role to play, and you've got to run those lists through your
computer systems.
When you have mega cases and mega firms, and the mega firms
tend to be the ones that do the debtor work in the large cases, you are
talking about an incredibly involved and inherently imprecise process.
And one of the things I always worry about is when we file our
affidavit in connection with your retention motion, we say we're disin-
terested to the best of our knowledge because that's really the best we
can say at any point in time.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, Marc, you're talking about the soft
landing case where you've had time to plan. What happens if you are
faced with the fact that somebody's going to file an involuntary in-
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stead. To preempt it you file, so you have really got a down-and-dirty
case. How do you do that kind of check and when do you do that kind
of check?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, I think you say, I'm disinterested, supple-
ment to follow. The three creditors I've been able to serve so far have
no issues with the other 45,000 that I will get back to you on. And in
all of our large cases, we are typically supplementing our retention
affidavits on a regular basis.
But there really is very little in the way of a de minimis rule. It's
kind of a bright line rule for whether you're disinterested or not. And
if it turns out you do further investigation and you find you're not
disinterested, you have to disclose. As debtor's counsel we often take
the position that disclosure cures all ills, and it really doesn't. We'll
talk about a couple of cases where that's the case.
But, Judge Fitzgerald, if I were to come in three months into the
case and file my supplemental affidavit, and it turns out that it's not
necessarily new information, it's newly discovered information, are
you going to tell me I wasn't disinterested on day one, and I've got to
give back the millions of dollars of fees I've generated in that period
of time?
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, the Third Circuit, unfortunately, is
pretty strict about that. And I think if it turns out that you've devel-
oped an actual conflict or you recognize that you now have an actual
conflict, there may be some requirement to make a disgorgement of
fees.
But I don't feel it is my obligation to raise those issues on my own.
I think the creditors should be raising them. They should be monitor-
ing them. If I see a problem with the disclosure statement, you're
probably not going to be counsel-not probably, you won't be counsel
going forward. But I don't know that I'm going to challenge what you
did in good faith unless somebody raises that issue.
And I hope that's not in violation of Third Circuit law because the
Third Circuit's pretty tough on making judges have an obligation at
looking at fees, but not necessarily at the appointment application it-
self as it gets modified from time to time.
MR. BAIRD: May I ask, what counts as a threshold for conflict? Just
so you understand the depth of the problem, if you're working for a
relatively small Midwestern firm like Kirkland & Ellis, you've got
partners you've never seen before. They have clients all over the
place. It's inconceivable that in any large case Kirkland & Ellis is not
going to be actively representing people who are creditors of United.
2003]
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MR. KIESELSTEIN: In matters unrelated to the debtor.
MR. BAIRD: Well, but that's-so that's one threshold you think is
okay.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, I think the tougher case is where firms
have merged and there was no conflict by the firm that represented
the debtor on the date the bankruptcy was filed. But then the merger
happens, and by the time they get the computer systems to read each
other and find out their client lists, if the case is still pending, because
sometimes it can take that long, you can develop an actual conflict.
MR. BAIRD: Yes, but let's define what an actual conflict is. Now, if
it's one of your partners representing a creditor of United but not
representing that creditor against United in a different matter, that's
going to be okay.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That's going to be okay.
HON. FITZGERALD: It has to be disclosed.
MR. BAIRD: If you disclose it.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Yes.
MR. BAIRD: Now, what if your partner is going to be the creditor's
counsel in the United case? Is that enough to-are you dead? Can
you give up the other representation?
HON. FITZGERALD: I think you make a balancing test, don't you,
as to which of the clients you want to keep.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Yeah. And that would be an easy one in virtu-
ally any scenario. We do have situations where we're coming up to a
filing and we see that there is someone down at the other end of the
firm in the London office or something who has some ongoing dispute
with the mega company that you're about to file or will be filing soon.
That's what the screening process is meant to do. And then, you
know, Jamie Sprayregen gets on the phone and has a conversation
with the other partner, and somehow or another it gets resolved, and
that other representation gets dealt with by replacement counsel. You
still disclosed that in the period prior to the filing you had this issue,
and you dealt with it in an appropriate way.
HON. FITZGERALD: Are you subject to being sued by the client
you gave up?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, clearly you want to reach a consensual
understanding. You don't want to just cut and run. Yes, you abandon
your client, you've got your Canons of Ethics, your Rules of Responsi-
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bility with respect to that client, so you deal with it on a case-by-case
basis, and hopefully you don't rupture the relationship by having this
one issue dealt with by somebody else.
HON. FITZGERALD: Can you get a waiver?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: There are some things that are waivable and
some things that are not waivable. I don't think I would want to come
into your courtroom and say, well, we got waivers from United, and
we got waivers from the other parties, so we're going to be on both
sides of this dispute.
HON. FITZGERALD: Probably not.
MS. MILLER: There is a distinction, though, between getting a
waiver of something that's a conflict versus the ethical rules that re-
quire you to vigorously represent your client, and that's not something
that I see as waivable in the same way as a conflict would be.
MR. BAIRD: What about this? How about if one of your partners is
representing shareholders in the United bankruptcy, can you represent
creditors?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: No.
HON. FITZGERALD: And the debtor, no, absolutely not.
MR. BAIRD: Okay. Let's say it's a corporation that has subsidiaries,
can you represent both at the same time?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, this is an issue with affiliated debtors.
MS. MILLER: But doesn't part of the answer for that depend upon
the extent to which there are loans between the related entities?
HON. FITZGERALD: Or claims back and forth that would have to
be cross-computed.
MS. MILLER: Or claims.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That is part of the issue. I think this is an issue
that's going to come up more and more as you see more cases that
involve substantive consolidation. If you're debtor's counsel for the
parent and the 28 related entities and you're advocating for substan-
tive consolidation, by definition, you're goring someone's ox. For
people who don't know, substantive consolidation means that you're
going to take all of the assets and liabilities of various corporate enti-
ties that are separate corporate entities, and you're going to, for lack
of a better term, mush them together so you have one pot of assets
and one pot of liabilities, which is going to have the inevitable effect
of increasing the return to some creditors in the solvent estate or more
2003]
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insolvent estates, and decreasing the return to creditors in the less in-
solvent estates.
HON. FITZGERALD: A case to watch along that score, Judge Wo-
lin, the same judge who wrote the Sealed Air opinion, has a substan-
tive consolidation trial going on right now in the Owens-Corning case.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Yes.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: In the situation you just posited, whose con-
flict is it? And what I mean by that question is, let's say each of the
holding company and its subsidiaries had separate counsel. They still
answer to the same C.E.O. and the same board of directors as the
holding company. So if you're concerned about that, is there any an-
swer other than having a separate trustee for each subsidiary and the
holding company? Because the conflict from the way I see it is not
generated by the attorney or the accountants. It's the one control per-
son for all the entities. So you can have a separate trustee for each
entity and a separate creditors' committee. And so you'll have-in
the average mega case, you'll have 25 trustees' and creditors' commit-
tees to deal with-
MR. BAIRD: Or in Enron you'd have 3,000 trustees and 3,000 -
MR. BIENENSTOCK: That's right.
MR. BAIRD: The path that gets you in a world where you say a law-
yer can't represent a parent and the subsidiaries, is a path to madness.
That world is just not going to work. It's not a responsible way to run
a bankruptcy. It just costs too much money. You're going to be
spending too much money on lawyer's fees and not enough money on
maximizing the value of the estate.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And I completely agree with that. The ques-
tion is when you get into situations where judges are being very literal,
as we've seen in a number of contexts of late, about what constitutes
standing or what the drafters of the Code meant is what they said,
then you might run into issues where someone says I hear you. It's a
problem.
And we'll talk about it in a minute, the Pillowtex case, where a
bright line rule is applied, and people say let the chips fall where they
may. That's what Judge Grady is saying in the critical trade case in
the Northern District. So if literalism is the wave of the future, then
you're going to run into issues like this where the practical realities,
unfortunately, give way.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, I don't know that there is a circuit
that's more literal in its interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code than
[Vol. 1:557
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the Third. Even if in the Marvel Entertainment case, looking at trustee
conflicts, makes some distinction between a potential and an actual
conflict and the fact that you don't have to have separate trustees for
related entities unless there is going to be this conflict that develops
and a suit or an action or something has to be brought against
another.
Now, that is talking trustees, not counsel for the debtor. But since
the debtor in possession is the trustee in the Chapter 11, I think there
could be some analogy that would work.
MR. BAIRD: Unfortunately, there's not a disinterestedness require-
ment for the debtor-in-possession in the way there is for counsel. But
if I could just try to generalize and give the yin and the yang of this.
The perspective from bankruptcy lawyers is to say look, the rules
that we're talking about were designed with this idea of A suing B.
It's one-on-one litigation. Outside of bankruptcy where I'm a lawyer,
and I write wills for lots of different people in town. In fact, two of
the people might be suing each other and each represented by a law-
yer in that transaction. It doesn't mean that I can't write a will for
these two people.
A lot of what happens in bankruptcy is negotiations, discussions and
so forth that don't have the characteristic of being actual litigation.
But even though they don't have the characteristic of being an actual
litigation we apply the conflict rules for litigation. This is problematic.
Bankruptcies are not about A suing B. It's about 3,000 debtors filing
at the same time and tens of thousands of creditors. You want to fig-
ure out the problems at relatively low cost.
You try to make that argument, however, to people who aren't
bankruptcy lawyers who are involved with rules of professional re-
sponsibility, and they say, "you're engaging in special pleading." We
hear it all the time. Everybody claims they're special. You're no dif-
ferent than anyone else. Live with it.
And that's the debate that you hear over and over and over again.
Ideally we'd like to get beyond that. But if you're strictly mechanical
and strictly literal, you quickly get the results that just aren't sensible.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Right.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, can you-let's not talk for a minute
about Pillowtex. Just one other question on the issue of a different
type of disinterestedness, creditor representation. Let's say you are
not disinterested for a period of time, can you cure that defect, not a
financial one, but a representational defect. Can you cure it?
2003]
564 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I would think so. I mean, some would say you
can't unring the bell, but I would think that there are ways. There are
fixes that one could create to resolve the situation and allow you to
then go forward. What happens in the period of time when you aren't
disinterested? Do you have to pay back your fees for that period of
time or it's-
HON. FITZGERALD: Can you get special counsel appointed under
some circumstances to represent the entity with which you might have
a conflict, assuming you can get their waiver to permit that to go on?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, in lots of large cases now, there are con-
flicts' counsel that are retained at the inception of the case basically
saying this is a big, huge, sprawling case, there are going to be situa-
tions, I can't necessarily identify them today, where I'm not in a posi-
tion to go forward as debtor's counsel because there will be some
conflict situation. But I'm going to put a prophylactic device in effect
right now. This other counsel will be there to handle all of those situa-
tions so everyone can rest assured that there won't be problems.
Now, it begs the question of, well, what do you mean? Why do you
need conflict counsel? Tell me the X, Y and Z of all of that, and I'll
decide whether or not that's a Band-Aid or a cure that I'll accept. But
I think it's a practical approach, as the professor said, for dealing with
a situation where conflicts are more or less inevitable.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: There's a hard and fast ethical rule that you
cannot sue current clients.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That's right.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: It is inevitable in the large cases that the
debtor's counsel or sometimes the committee that's going to be suing
on avoidance actions and the like will affect current clients.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Right.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: So even if the current client were to waive
and give consent, you wouldn't have the right appearance. It would
look wrong. So we often have conflicts' counsel, and in these really
large cases, one firm can't do it all anyway. It's not even efficient for
one firm to do it all. So the conflicts' counsel I think has been right-
fully accepted as the right solution.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, let's tell them about Pillowtex.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Sure, let's move on to Pillowtex. Jones Day
represented Pillowtex, a textile company.
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Let me take a minute to explain preferences. Preferences are pay-
ments made within the 90 days prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
case, but under certain circumstances can be recovered by the debtor
post petition and spread evenly pro rata across the creditor body. It's
meant to serve as a disincentive to people and prevent them from
knocking down the door when a company is experiencing financial
difficulties. It only exists inside of a bankruptcy case, but it is poten-
tially a large source of recovery, particularly in these mega cases for
creditors.
Any one you pay within the 90 days is a potential preference defen-
dant, including your lawyers. And as part of your schedules that you
file after you file for bankruptcy, you have to list out all the payments
that you made within the 90 days before you filed.
Here Jones Day received approximately a million dollars in the 90-
day period before they filed. They went into court under Section
327(a) to get retained and disclosed the fact that they had received
these payments within the 90 days. No creditor had any issue with
them being retained as debtor's counsel. But the U.S. Trustee, and
the U.S. Trustee is an odd duck, is in essence the ombudsman of the
bankruptcy process that exists in every judicial district, and what
they're there for is to make sure that the process retains its integrity
and is done in accordance with the rules, et cetera. They don't have a
pecuniary interest in cases, but they have a right to come in and be
heard on virtually any issue in the case.
The U.S. Trustee came in and said we've seen the disclosure about
these payments. We think it might be a preference. We don't really
know, but it might be, and, therefore, they may not be disinterested,
and, therefore, they shouldn't be hired.
Jones Day said this is silly. We don't think it's a preference, but in
case it is, what we'll do is we'll agree if we are found to have received
a preference, we will, of course, return the money, and we will waive
any claim that we have when we return the money.
Normally when you give back a preference, which is, after all, just a
payment for goods and services, there's no moral component to pref-
erences. You just got paid in a time frame where you have to give it
back. You get a claim for that amount. You give back a thousand
dollars of real dollars and you get a claim for a thousand bankruptcy
dollars, whatever percentage that ultimately turns out to be. So
they're going to give back that money, and they say, no problem, if
there's ever a preference, we'll cure it that way.
District courts sitting in bankruptcy said that's fine, no problem,
you're retained. The U.S. Trustee pursued its quest appeals. The case
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rolled along. Plaintiffs confirmed it was a successful case by all ac-
counts, and then the Third Circuit came down with a ruling about six
months ago that says those prophylactic devices are not good.
You have to make a determination on the front end of the case
whether or not this creditor is- or this party is disinterested or not.
So you have to go through, I guess, a preference trial or the equivalent
of it right at the inception of the case to make a threshold determina-
tion about whether the law firm is disinterested or not. And having
failed to do that, the court remanded down to the district court and
said let's figure out if there's a preference. If there was, then they
never were disinterested, and since they were never disinterested, they
weren't eligible to be hired in the first place, and every dollar of their
fees is potentially at risk. That's the implication.
So it's a real sort of gotcha situation. One could argue that the
debtor's counsel was on notice, but what was the debtor's counsel to
do on the first day of the case? They'd received the monies. They had
a choice. They could-
MR. BAIRD: Give all the money back.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: They could give the money back and just say
even though I don't think it's a preference, I'm giving it back because
some day it might be, and that's the cost of doing business.
MS. MILLER: Well, one of the suggestions that I raised when we
were talking about this earlier this morning was, wouldn't it have been
sufficient for them to have put the money into an escrow account and
have it sitting there and agree to waive their claim in the event that it
was subsequently determined that it was a preference?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I don't think so because I don't think the
creditworthiness of Jones Day was at issue.
MR. BAIRD: The question is, would the lawyer for the debtor in
possession aggressively pursue that preference action?
MS. MILLER: I guess the other side of the coin on that, Doug, is, can
they even defend that action because they're then taking action
against the estate which clearly puts them in the adverse position?
HON. FITZGERALD: Surely they could get counsel to represent
them.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Special counsel on both sides.
MR. BAIRD: In Enron I think the-with respect to I think the coun-
sel for the creditor's committee, they agreed to basically roll over-
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MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, what happened was the examiner deter-
mined that they had received a preference, and while the examiner
was not a judge, it was the better part of discretion from Milbank say-
ing here's the money. We waive the claim. Let's put that behind us.
HON. FITZGERALD: See, I think the problem in Pillowtex is based
on the fact that in the Price Waterhouse opinion in the Sharon Steel
case years ago, the Circuit took a look at the fact that Price
Waterhouse had not been paid about $900,000 prepetition for work
that it had done.
So it came into the bankruptcy holding a claim for $900,000, and it
did not agree at the outset that it would either waive the claim or not
vote on the plan. Then as the hearing went on, it agreed that it would
not vote on the plan, but it still wanted to have its claim. So the issue
goes up to the Circuit, and the Circuit decided, no, you can't have a
claim in a bankruptcy as a professional and still represent the debtor.
They're not disinterested.
So now the question is, well, all right, if I can't have a claim-
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And I can't take the payment.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, no, what professionals were doing was
not taking the payment, which they hadn't been doing because it had
been helping their client's cash flow situation before, but now they're
taking the payment because otherwise they can't continue to re-
present the debtor. Well, the problem with Pillowtex is, now Pillowtex
has said you would have had a claim if you hadn't taken the payment.
You shouldn't have taken the payment because it's a preference;
therefore, you still have a claim so you're not disinterested.
So you're in a Hobson's choice. I think the only thing you can do,
and I suppose this will work, is always work against a retainer. I know
in some states, I believe in California, and I'm not a California law
expert, but I had this issue once, so I guess it's maybe still the case,
retainers are deemed to be paid in full and earned in full when paid.
So I don't know if that solves the problem. No, that's not the case?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: It depends on the kind of-
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Not according to the U.S. Trustees.
HON. FITZGERALD: Oh, well, okay. Then if that's the case, it's
not an issue. I was concerned that if you had a fully earned retainer
before you had provided any services, then you've got a fraudulent
conveyance on your hands. So I didn't see how you could get around
2003]
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In states where that isn't an issue and you can take a retainer and
bill against services, I think maybe the whole legal world of insolvency
practice and for every professional in it is just going to have to get to
the point where they are always working against a retainer.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And as a practical matter, one of the things we
tell new clients is if we're stupid enough to become one of your credi-
tors, you don't want us as your bankruptcy counsel.
So we get a healthy retainer up front. Our billing practices are not
the normal billing practices where we send you an invoice every
month telling you what it is. We replenish that retainer on a regular
basis and we calculate it so we're staying ahead of the game, not just
for billed time, but also recorded and unbilled time.
And the problem is that when you have a client that by definition is
in extremis or close to it, and you are in essence dunning them virtu-
ally every Friday, you know, "Where's my wire transfer?" you have
already created a level, not of adversity, but a level, of tension in your
relationship you'd rather not have.
MS. MILLER: And by not doing that, and if you get behind the eight
ball, you can't necessarily get out from representation of that client,
particularly if you're involved in litigation. You're having to seek au-
thority from the court, and you may not get out.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, that's the other problem. Just because
you're disinterested, if you're in the middle of a litigation when that
happens, the court may say too bad, you're in. You made the mistake.
You're in until this is over, and then we'll say goodbye.
MS. MILLER: You know, the other point to make, that people tend
to forget about that aren't as experienced, is you have § 328(c) of the
Code; any point along the way until fees become subject to a final
order, the interim order is all along-any point in time disinterested-
ness can be raised, adverse interest can be raised, and if it's found by a
court at that point in time that you were not or you haven't made a
subsequent-filed a subsequent affidavit under the Federal Rules to
disclose changed circumstances and you're found in that case to vio-
late it, any time that you have incurred or anything you will have re-
ceived in the case is going to be subject to disgorgement.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: And there's a range of court decisions about
what the sanction is for either not disclosing something or simply fail-
ing the disinterestedness test, either looking backward or whatever.
And some of those opinions are the death penalty basically. Every
dollar back and never another dollar coming to you. Some try to be
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more measured in their approach, but they say, look, if you're not
disinterested, you can't be counsel. If you're not counsel, you can't be
paid; therefore, you have to give it all back.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, can this one be cured? You've received
the preference. It's identified in the application process. The court
doesn't hold a whole evidentiary hearing but says to you, this one
looks kind of like you've got a preference. What are you going to do
about it? You say, fine, we'll give the money back and waive any
claim that we have. Has that cured the disinterestedness for the pe-
riod of time that you were counsel until you gave the money back and
waived the claim?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: This has spread like wildfire throughout the
U.S. Trustee system. In fact, after the opinion came out, the U.S.
Trustee general counsel, in the executive office in Washington, wrote
an article and said whatever the inconvenience or practical problems
presented, time and attention must be spent to assure the conflicts of
interest are addressed fully and in a manner consistent with the Bank-
ruptcy Code. And Pillowtex should serve as an important reminder
that some of these conflicts will be disqualified regardless of the pro-
phylactic steps that are taken.
HON. FITZGERALD: And he's a former Chapter 7 trustee himself,
so he's familiar with what we're talking about.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: So we've seen, for instance, in the United case
where a financial professional was alleged by the U.S. Trustee to have
received a preference, that it got settled, but eventually the settlement
was, well, you're just not going to get paid your monthly fee the first
two months of the case. So you're not actually giving back your pref-
erence, but you're taking a holiday from getting your fee paid and
then all is forgiven.
Now, whether that was an effective cure under the Pillowtex line of
thinking, I don't know. Judge Wedoff didn't seem to be troubled by it.
So this is an issue that's of great concern. Rick left so I didn't hear the
rest of the story after the remand. I think it's still being discussed
down at the district court level. So certainly something to keep in
mind.
The second stress point I wanted to talk about is multiple creditor
representation. To give an example from the United case, there we
had public debt in that deal, aircraft securitizations where there were
literally hundreds of public debt holders. There was an ad hoc com-
mittee formed with a particular counsel rounding up his clients to re-
present their interests as a whole. The problem was, they didn't file a
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statement which you're required to file. It's the Rule 2019 statement
that tells the world that you represent multiple parties in this case so
that the court knows, so that the debtor knows, so that your other
clients know in fact that you are representing not merely them but a
bunch of other people as well. And in that situation, the securitization
instruments had various tranches of debt. You had the A holders who
got paid before the B holders who got paid before the C holders. And
you had counsel loading too much onto their shoulders trying to re-
present people in each tranch, inherent conflict of interest between
people who had different rights and priorities and, in fact, had subor-
dination agreements between them contractually.
And it took a while to tease that issue in the court, and ultimately
Judge Wedoff said I don't really see how you can take on this multi-
ple-creditor representation because it's inherently riddled with con-
flict. They don't have a disinterestedness requirement when they
come in, but they are subject to the Rules of Professional Responsibil-
ity and the Canons of Ethics.
And we don't do a lot of creditor work, but if any of the creditors'
counsel, if they're still around, I don't know how people actually man-
age some of those situations. Sometimes it's creditors to trade credi-
tors who have the same side of interest. They both want the debtor to
reorganize so they can collect as much as they can on their prepetition
claim, and there is no point where their interests are not locked.
MS. MILLER: What about when you're representing multiple credi-
tors on the front end and then one of them becomes subject to the
preference action? Those creditors who are not subject to the prefer-
ence action want that money repaid.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Correct.
MS. MILLER: It is impossible to not have a conflict in continuing to
represent the other creditor that's subject to the preference defense
who doesn't want to put money in that's ultimately going to go to their
benefit.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Which happens every day.
MS. MILLER: It happens all the time.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: In the Bankruptcy Code, there's nothing
that says that a creditor representative can't have a conflict of interest,
right?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: No, and we're not-





ROBERT BERNSTEIN: Which also allow conflicts of interest with
disclosure and waiver, and so long as the counsel can make the deter-
mination that the conflict doesn't impair her ability to represent
either.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Which may well occur.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: Well, it's possible.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Yeah, sure.
MS. MILLER: The question is going to come to whether it is a waiv-
able conflict in the first case.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: Everything's waivable.
MS. MILLER: Oh, no, I don't think everything is waivable.
MR. BAIRD: It could get a little more complicated. Let's say if you
were not only a creditor, but also serving on the creditors' committee.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: Well, that may be different because you
have fiduciary responsibilities to the committee and to the case. But
just as a creditor representative, there are lots of conflicts that you
could maintain and have waived.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Absolutely. And it's just when it's refracted
through the prism of a large case where issues like the one alluded to
can arise at any time, it's very hard to strike that balance. And I
would guess there are lots of situations where local counsel take on
representations as they sort of come in the door, don't go through the
process of explaining to their client all the situations in which these
issues may come up and interests may diverge.
MR. BAIRD: Just to give an example in a large case, you've had the
same law firm representing in Enron both JP Morgan and Arthur An-
dersen. Both are clients of very longstanding. JP Morgan is on the
creditors' committee. How can you sort that out? Can the firm con-
tinue to represent either in the case?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: That was the Milbank issue in Enron where
they wanted to be committee counsel and people said they cannot be
because they represent all these potential targets in litigation, et
cetera. And Judge Gonzalez said, I don't see it as a problem. I'm
oversimplifying. And an article came out shortly thereafter-I don't
remember what publication-called "The Death of Conflicts." I was
wondering why they don't exist in bankruptcy anymore.
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GARY PLOTKIN: You know, what bothers me is what's called the
Sprehagen Rule (phonetic). For a debtor to have a zillion other-
MR. KIESELSTEIN: I'm sorry, which rule was it?
GARY PLOTKIN: The Sprehagen Rule. But if you have a public
company with 9 zillion subsidiaries, there has to be inherent conflicts
within those subsidiaries. There just has to be. And you say, no prob-
lem, it's for the economy of the case. And then when you have one
attorney representing 20 creditors going to a meeting as opposed to 20
attorneys, you say conflict, can't do it. That bothers me.
HON. FITZGERALD: See, I don't see that there are necessarily al-
ways inherent conflicts in the subsidiaries. Many times the subsidiar-
ies are done for some business and tax purposes, and they're really not
an operating entity. They may have siphoned off some assets or hold
some debt or something like that-
GARY PLOTKIN: That's a conflict, siphoned off assets, hold debt?
HON. FITZGERALD: No, no, I mean siphoned off in a negative
sense. Let me amend the statement. I just mean they may be holding
some of the assets of the estate for tax purposes, but in fact they all
operate together in one unified entity, and they do consolidated bal-
ance sheets.
GARY PLOTKIN: We had one down in Florida a year ago, byebye-
now.com. It was one of these public companies that was here today,
gone tomorrow. The subsidiaries were totally solvent, at least two of
them were, and the parent was totally insolvent, and the judge didn't
see a conflict. But to me there's an absolute conflict there.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Well, I guess I would say a couple of things.
One, in lots of cases where the subsidiaries are in essence sort of
joined at the hip with the success of the parent-take United for in-
stance. You've got the airline, and then you've got a subsidiary that
runs the Mileage Plus program, okay, and obviously they're different
entities, they have different sets of creditors. One may be more insol-
vent or less insolvent. But the success of that subsidiary that runs the
Mileage Plus program is inherently and inextricably linked to the suc-
cess of the airline. And a reorganization for one is, maybe not for
every single creditor - I don't know, is going to be good for the over-
all enterprise.
GARY PLOTKIN: But United has subsidiary regional carriers. I
don't know if they do or they don't anymore.
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MR. KIESELSTEIN: They're not subsidiaries. It's just contractual
relationships.
GARY PLOTKIN: Like United Express, is United Express still-
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Third parties.
GARY PLOTKIN: So they're not from preceding?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: No.
GARY PLOTKIN: But if they were in preceding, would you be able
to represent them?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: I don't know.
MR. BAIRD: Well, can you represent both Enron's trading entity
that's generating cash and other entities that aren't and that actually
would like some of that cash to go to their creditors? Is that possible?
MR. BIENENSTOCK: Well, we do that. And the solution in Enron
is that we have an examiner-
MR. BAIRD: But that I think is your problem.
MR. BIENENSTOCK: We have two examiners that look at a host of
issues including issues that might pit one group of creditors against
another, and if they're not negotiated out by the creditor groups, there
are other means of bringing the actions. And we determined which is
the best law firm-it could be a committee law firm or it could be a
debtor law firm-to bring it. But that's been much more efficient
than having each debtor have a separate committee and a separate
management.
HON. FITZGERALD: I think a separate committee and separate
management in cases that have 1660 - that Canadian case that was
filed with 999 subsidiaries, you can't manage cases like that. I just-I
don't know that it's necessarily a conflicts issue.
I think if an actual conflict issue developed, you'd have to figure out
a way to manage it, but I just can't imagine that there's so much of an
inherit conflict that you can't start with the idea that if they're operat-
ing as an integrated entity, that you can have one attorney. And then
if something shows that you're wrong, you fix it.
MS. MILLER: One other issue that we talked about this morning,
and I know it was brought up last week when I was at another confer-
ence, and I think it's a fascinating issue having to do with the ethical
rules regarding solicitation and the formation of creditors' commit-
tees. Do you want to talk about that at all?
HON. FITZGERALD: How can you do it except in writing?
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MS. MILLER: You can't under the rules, and I'm not sure that peo-
ple really appreciate the nuances between the two, and what actually
goes on in practicality.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: Yes. In the relatively short number of days
that elapse between a filing and a formation meeting, there is lots of
talk and chatter, and it's not-very little of it is in writing. And,
frankly, it would be impractical, again, for it all to be that way. And
what happens at the formation meeting is you've got a parade of law
firms, financial professionals that outnumber the creditors, generally
speaking, coming in, doing their pitches, saying why they should be
retained in that case, going and trying to get-jockey for this creditor
or for that creditor's support, it's back office-it's backroom stuff.
MS. MILLER: And basically what the ethical rules in most of the
states say, unless this is an existing client, you can't communicate with
them other than by in writing. So if you want to call someone that you
have a contact with that you know someone at the company who you
find is on the top 20, and because of knowing them you think that you
can schmooz with them and get them to support you, you have vio-
lated the ethical rules if you haven't done it in writing.
ROBERT BERNSTEIN: Just a quick point on that, Marc. It's one
thing for the bankruptcy court to look at the disinterested require-
ment of its own code and say it's not practical to impose on a mega
case with 3,000 subsidiaries. But I think Judy's point is a good one; it's
quite another thing for practitioners to violate the Code-the discipli-
nary rules. And the bankruptcy court, while it may have some impact
on that or some opinion on that, isn't the final word if you're out there
soliciting in violation of your state's Code?
MR. KIESELSTEIN: It's not something the bankruptcy court would
even have jurisdiction over. Someone could drag a firm in front of the
disciplinary board and say this is not something that's permissible, and
it's not for Judge Wedoff or any other judge to say otherwise.
HON. FITZGERALD: Well, in Pennsylvania many times, though,
the ethical issues are reported to the disciplinary board. They come
back to us saying there's a court forum to deal with this. You're better
equipped to look at the issue than we are, and they refer it back. So I
don't know the jurisdictional issue, but they end up on the docket.
MR. KIESELSTEIN: It's clearly a complicated set of issues that gets
lost in the noise sometimes, and one of these days it's going to crop
up.
[Vol. 1:557
